2. On special status issues

In the crocifisso decision of 1990 The Federal Court was required to rule on the special status of public primary schools in relation to a religious symbol. The dispute before the Court was the question of whether crucifixes that were attached to the walls of every classroom breached the doctrine of state impartiality. In this respect the Court in its ratio decidendi said that ‘actions, which might offend the religious sensitivities of pupils and parents’, might not be state imposed.[2] It further held that it is ‘conceivable that those who attended the school will see in this symbol the will to follow concepts of the Christian religion in education, or the will to place teaching under the influence of that religion. Nor can it be excluded that some persons feel offended in their religious beliefs by the constant presence of a religious symbol which belongs to another religion’.[3] Moreover, the Court added, opiter dictum, that ‘the same case would probably be decided differently if we had to rule on the presence of a crucifix in a part of the school premises which is commonly used – such as the lobby, corridors, or refectory’.[4] From this it can be deduced that the Court makes a distinction between children’s or parents’ concerns about unwarranted religious indoctrination and mere confrontation with a traditional religion, which may or may not be a pupil’s own.[5]

In its decision the Court did not question whether a crucifix is a religious symbol. It simply presumed so by stating that a crucifix ‘is in Western cultures a symbol of Christianity’.[6] The question whether a crucifix is specifically used by particular denominations[7] was not raised at all. The contrary is the case in the Genevan vêtements réligieux decision of 1997.  There, the question whether a specific thing represented a religious symbol was pivotal. A teacher who had converted from Catholicism to Islam wanted the judicial body to regard her special clothing, which covered all parts of her body except her face, as ‘for aesthetic reasons’.[8] The judges were, however, wholely uncovinced by her claim, and made reference to the precious Quoran (sura 24:31, and sura 33:59). They said: ‘There is no doubt, the headscarf and loose-fitting clothing is not for aesthetic reasons but to follow a religious requirement’.[9] The Court then concluded that the special clothing in question is a strong religious symbol because its signalizing effect ‘is immediately visible to others, indicating that the person wearing it adheres to a specific religion’.[10]

In spite of that, it was held in the same decision that the scope of religious profession – in the form and quality of religious practice – generally covers the right to wear religious clothing by stipulating: ‘Practice guarantees that freedom of religion encompasses not just cults [...] and religious requirements, but also other expressions of religious life, provided that they are held within certain limits. Restrictions apply to the religious clothing of individuals, and concern the dress requirements of Muslim women especially’.[11]

On the balance of reasonableness the Court ruled that it was likely that the religious feelings of pupils and their parents were affected by the teacher’s wearing of religious clothing. Her clothes were therefore held to contradict the doctrine of state impartiality. The Court in its positive obligation said that it aims were not only to protect religious beliefs, but also, and especially, to ensure religious harmony. ‘It should be noted that the school might become a place of confrontation if teachers were allowed to express their strong beliefs also by means of religious clothing,’ it declared.[12]

Religious clothing seems not to be treated in all cases in the same way. In the canton of Ticcino a school board prohibited a pupil from wearing an Islamic scarf at a public primary school. This decision was reversed by the conference of directors of public education, which authorized all pupils’ equally to wear traditional religious symbols.[13]

The conference of directors thereby made a clear distinction between pupils and teachers who wear a religious symbol. Public primary school teachers, who are state employees, step into a proximate relationship with the state. Even if it can hardly be said that they are representing the state, their actions can be regarded as indirect state exercise. Thus, if they are in their professional capacity leaning towards a particular religion or belief system, it is difficult to regard the public school system in which they act as religiously or confessionally impartial.

3. On naturalization issues

The protection of religious symbols was also raised in the naturalization context. Recently, in the Birr decision of 2008, the Federal Court had to consider a migrant’s naturalization application which had been rejected by the Municipal Citizens’ Assembly (Einwohner-Gemeindeversammlung) on the grounds that his wife’s headscarf represented a religious symbol of insufficient integration, and non-compliance with basic laws.[14] The Assembly argued: ‘The headscarf gives women a different gender and social role, which contradicts the principle of equality, guaranteed in general by universally applicable human rights, and in particular by the Swiss constitution. It is therefore contested that Mr. K. [...] respects, minds, and lives in accordance with equality between men and women’.[15] The Court ruled against the decision of the Assembly. It concluded that the ‘unequal treatment of the claimant as a result of a religious manifestation, and the compliance with religious practices by his wife cannot be justified on qualified or objective grounds whatsoever. Beliefs which are based upon religious motivation or advice to wear certain clothes are generally not to be examined or valued’.[16]

Similarly, in the Buchs ruling of 2008 the naturalization of a migrant was initially refused because she was wearing a headscarf. The Municipal Citizens’ Council (Einwohnerrat) justified the refusal by stating that the migrant’s wearing of a headscarf ‘manifested a fundamentalist belief’.[17] In addition, the council claimed that the headscarf is not a religious symbol, but a ‘visible expression of the subjugation of women by men’.[18] However, the Federal Court held the local council’s ruling unconstitutional and responded: ‘The wearing of a headscarf by women, […] who believe in Islam is an expression of religious conviction’, and continued by stating that ‘allegations of individual municipal councillors, which deny the religious character and symbol of the wearing of a headscarf, cannot rebut this reasoning’.[19] It is noticeable that the question whether a headscarf can, indeed, be regarded as a religious symbol was neither posed, nor commented on by the court.

4. On construction or building issues

The same is true of the Federal Court’s Aluminiumkreuz decision of 2004, which concerned the field of construction and building laws. It ruled – without any further consideration – that a 7.38-meter high, blue illuminated cross erected on the property of the claimant is to be regarded as a religious symbol that receives general Article 15 protection.[20] In casu, however, the court denied the continuance of its presence on the claimant’s property on the grounds that the cross was likely to cause visual disturbance to neighbours.[21]

The question whether a minaret (a tower of a mosque) can be viewed as a religious symbol was raised by the public.[22] But the Federal Court has so far not had the opportunity to decide upon it.[23] Nevertheless, the Cantonal Administrative Court of Solothurn said in the Wangen-Minarett decision of 2007, which concerned the legality of the construction of a minaret on the roof of an Islamic community centre, that: ‘A church without a tower is still a church. A prayer room without a minaret is still a prayer room. Through the construction of a minaret, which is anyway merely symbolic, the use of prayer rooms is unchanged’.[24]

Swiss courts do not always rule that a particular thing, which to some objectively represents a religious symbol, qualifies it as such. In the Glockengeläut Bubikon ruling of the year 2000 the Federal Court wrote in its ratio: ‘Church bells possess for many people a melodious sound, and their steady tone – even early in the morning – is regarded as a widespread ancient tradition. Church bell ringing has been carved into the consciousness of people far beyond the circle of the faithful. It is also capable of moving the feelings of religiously indifferent people, and is, for a great proportion of the population, part of the fixed daily routine’.[25]

The Court appears to be making no clear-cut distinction between symbols of tradition with religious determination and ‘pure’ symbols of religion. In respect to this ruling both concepts seem to overlap. Similarly, in the Islamisches Begräbnis decision of 1999 there was no mention that a burial in accordance with the claimant’s Islamic beliefs could be regarded as a religious symbol. Instead, it held that such a right is generally protected under the fundamental guarantee of a ‘ respectful burial’ (schickliches Begräbnis), a concept that is by means of case law similarly protected under Article 15(2) of the Federal Constitution.[26]

5. Conclusion and suggestion

Swiss courts have decided that crucifixes, crosses, religious clothing (including headscarves), and minarets can all be regarded as religious symbols. However, from the Glockengeläut Bubikon and the Islamisches Begräbnis decisions it can be inferred that the Federal Court considers ‘symbolic religious acts or expressions’ rather hesitantly as religious symbols. It has an inclination towards protecting them under separate concepts equally or similarly guaranteed by the right to freedom of belief and conscience. A clear-cut differentiation between religious symbols and other aspects of profession may not be necessary in view of a court’s practical considerations.

However, decisions such as the one taken in vêtements réligieux demonstrate that it might be all the more significant how courts come to the conclusion that a particular object or thing is protected under the Article 15 guarantee. From the above analysis it is evident that Swiss courts are all but hesitant in their decision taking process. Except in the vêtements réligieux decision, and to a very limited extent in the Glockengeläut Bubikon and the Birr decisions, the Federal Court did not expressly apply a dogmatic test in order to draw its conclusion. Hence, its considerations (Erwägungen) in respect to the cases analysed usually have not followed a specific and well-ordered pattern. To the Federal Court this seems not to be necessary even if the matter in question is more complex, as in the crocifisso decision.[27] Arguably, this seemingly rash approach increases the risk of legal uncertainty because it is difficult to reasonably foresee the outcome of a case.

In fact, it is the Federal Court itself that introduced a three-dimensional test for such cases as the above. In the leading Schwimmunterricht I decision of 1993 the Court stipulated: ‘As long as the content of a religious doctrine is at stake, the federal court must act with great restraint. Yet the assessment of a religious attitude or rules, or even the review of theological truth – in particular the interpretation of the relevant parts in holy scriptures – remains barred to the Federal Court, unless limits of arbitrariness are exceeded’.[28]

The first two dimensions can be reformulated in the following way. In the first instance, Swiss courts are required not to exercise religious interpretation. In the second, however, this principle may be of no effect provided that a person’s claim that a specific thing represents a religious symbol is so unreasonable that no reasonable court (or body in general) could ever come to the same conclusion. As for the latter, the Genevan vêtements réligieux decision is a useful example. In this decision the Court said that a thing (here religious clothing) is a religious symbol if its ‘signalizing effect is immediaely visible to others indicating that [...] it adheres to a specific religion’. [29] Hence, the second dimension protects the judicial system from very obvious misuse. However, what would be the case if it were not so evident that a claimant was trying to mislead the court? How should Swiss courts react if a particular assertion seemed not as arbitrary as in the vêtements réligieux case?

In the Schwimmunterricht I decision the Federal Court gave further guidance. It said that it ‘is able to deal with religion as a social phenomenon devoid of limits’.[30] The problem, which arises from this third dimension of the test, is the fact that it is virtually impossible to justly differentiate between religion as a social phenomenon and religion as a purely religious phenomenon. Conceivably, a belief, which is from a person’s most intimate sphere carried outwards into a public sphere, is most often professed in some form of social manner. Religion is a phenomenon – that is to say an existing situation – because its very essence is to guide people in their truthful way of life. This means that persons whose belief systems or religions regulate every aspect of life can always face judicial construction. This may be especially true in the case of Islam.

The doctrine of state neutrality holds that the state is required to consider religion or belief impartially.[31] Thus, the neutral judiciary enjoys broad but nevertheless limited capacities to give value judgements in respect to religious symbols. Remember, the Federal Court said: ‘As long as the content of a religious doctrine is at stake, the Federal Court must act with great restraint’.[32] This does not mean that the judiciary must ignore religion or belief entirely, but to accept where appropriate its professional limitations.[33] Swiss judges do not officially receive religious training during their professional or academic careers. Without expert support it is therefore questionable whether they are always capable of taking just decisions in religious symbol cases. For this reason I suggest the following, consecutive, three-dimensional test.

(1) Courts are generally required not to exercise religious interpretation.

(2) Provided that a person’s claim that a specific thing represents a religious symbol is so unreasonable that no reasonable court could ever come to the same conclusion, Paragraph (1) is of no effect.

(3) Provided that it is not instantly clear that Paragraph (2) applies, a court in the process of reaching a decision can consult a religious expert of the belief concerned.

The first and second dimension draws directly on the Federal Court’s interpretation. The third dimension should not be interpreted to mean that courts are deprived of their competences, or that the doctrine of separation of powers becomes in any way fused. The words ‘can consult’ refer to the fact that Courts are still the only power capable of deciding fully and independently on the scope of religious freedom. Paragraph (3) of the test can be a valuable aid – no more, no less. Expert opinions in Swiss courts are nothing new or unique. The word ‘opinion’ does not refer to a personal opinion of a specific expert, but a general, scientific view about a thing. ‘Expert’ refers to one or several experts depending on the complexity of a case. It is up to judicial discretion to decide when such advice is appropriate.[34] This may be the case if the court is unable, because of lack of knowledge, to take the conception of the average hypothetical believer into consideration. It is conceivable that such incidents occur when it comes to non-traditional religious communities especially. So, provided that the circumstances of the case allow it, judges can in areas where they have no or very limited knowledge be reasonably supported by experts who possess comprehensive or authoritative knowledge of the religion or belief system concerned.

[1] (Author’s translation) ‘Jede Person hat das Recht, ihre Religion und ihre weltanschauliche Überzeugung frei zu wählen und allein oder in Gemeinschaft mit anderen zu bekennen’. See Swiss Federal Constitution of 1999 (Bundesverfassung der Schweizerischen Eidgenossenschaft vom 18. April 1999, SR 101).

[2] (Author’s translation) ‘[...] comportamenti suscettibili di offendere la sensibilità religiosa di allievi e genitori [...]’. See Federal Supreme Court Decision (BGE 116 Ia 252, E. 6a, S. 261).

[3] (Author’s translation) ‘È pertanto concepibile che chi frequenta la scuola pubblica veda nell'esposizione di tale simbolo la volontà di rifarsi a concezioni della religione cristiana in materia di insegnamento o quella di porre l'insegnamento sotto l'influsso di tale religione. Non è neppure escluso che alcune persone si sentano lese nelle loro convinzioni religiose dalla presenza costante nella scuola di un simbolo di una religione alla quale non appartengono’. See Federal Supreme Court Decision (BGE 116 Ia 252, E. 7, S. 262 f.).

[4] (Author’s translation) ‘Il giudizio sarebbe forse stato diverso ove si fosse trattato di statuire sulla presenza del crocifisso nei locali scolastici adibiti ad uso comune, come ad esempio l'atrio, i corridoi, il refettorio o, evidentemente, dove esistano [...]’. See Federal Supreme Court Decision (BGE 116 Ia 252, E. 7c, S. 262 f.).

[5] It seems as if this fine distinction is not equally welcome to all commentators. Walter Gut writes: ‘It is also difficult to make it understandable that there might exist a fundamental difference between class rooms and the school premises for general use’ (Author’s translation) ‘Es hält auch schwer, einsichtig zu machen, dass wirklich ein wesentlicher Unterschied bestehen könnte zwischen Schulzimmern einerseits und Schlräumen für den allgemeinen Gebrauch andererseits’. See Gut Walter, Kreuz und Kruzifix in öffentlichen Räumen, Eine Auseinandersetzung mit Gerichtsentscheiden über Kreuze und Kruzifix in kommunalen Schulzimmern (NZN-Buchverlag, Zürich 1997) p. 47.

[6] (Author’s translation) ‘[…] simbolo nella civiltà occidentale del cristianesimo […]’, See Federal Supreme Court Decision (BGE 116 Ia 252, E. 7b, S. 262 f.).

[7] E.g. the Catholic, the Anglican, and the Eastern Orthodox Churches, but not the Evangelical Reformed Church.

[8] (Author’s translation) ‘pour des raisons esthétiques’. See Federal Supreme Court Decision (BGE 123 I 296, E. 2a, S. 299).

[9] (Author’s translation) ‘[...] il ne fait aucun doute que la recourante porte le foulard et des vêtements amples non pas pour des raisons esthétiques mais afin d'obéir à une exigence religieuse [...]’. See Federal Supreme Court Decision (BGE 123 I 296, E. 2a, S. 299).

[10] (Author’s translation) ‘[...] un signe immédiatement visible pour les tiers, indiquant clairement que son porteur adhère à une religion déterminée’. See Federal Supreme Court Decision (BGE 123 I 296, E. 2a, S. 300).

[11] (Author’s translation) ‘L'exercice garanti de cette religion ne comprend pas seulement les cultes [...] et les besoins religieux, mais aussi d'autres expressions de la vie religieuse, pour autant qu'elles se tiennent dans certaines limites, par exemple le port de vêtements religieux particuliers concernant précisément les prescriptions vestimentaires de la femme musulmane’. See Federal Supreme Court Decision (BGE 123 I 296, E. 2a, S. 300 f.).

[12] (Author’s translation) ‘[...] il faut relever que l'école risquerait de devenir un lieu d'affrontement religieux si les maîtres étaient autorisés par leur comportement, notamment leur habillement, à manifester fortement leurs convictions dans ce domaine’. See Federal Supreme Court Decision (BGE 123 I 296, E. 4a, S. 305 f.).

[13] Second Periodic Reports of Switzerland, submitted by states parties under Article 40 of the Covenant, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/CH/98/2, (6 September 1999) para. 165.

[14] It must be noted that the right to freedom of belief and conscience as protected under Article 15 of the constitution received in this decision no direct or independent meaning. It is the fundamental right to equality that was predominately in question here. Freedom of belief and conscience played a secondary role only. See Federal Supreme Court Decision (BGE 134 I 56, E. 4.1, S. 59).

[15] (Author’s translation) ‘Das Kopftuch weist Frauen eine geschlechtlich und sozial differente Rolle zu, die im Gegensatz zum Gleichheitsgrundsatz der universell gültigen allgemeinen Menschenrechte und insbesondere der Schweizerischen Bundesverfassung steht. Somit wird bestritten, dass Herr K. [...] die Gleichstellung von Mann und Frau respektiert, achtet und danach auch lebt’. See Federal Supreme Court Decision (BGE 134 I 56, Sachverhalt, S. 57).

[16] (Author’s translation) ‘Diese Ungleichbehandlung des Beschwerdeführers infolge eines religiösen Bekenntnisses und der Befolgung von religiösen Gebräuche durch die Ehefrau läss sich durch keinerlei qualifizierte oder objektive Gründe rechtfertigen. Glaubensinhalte, die ein religiös motiviertes Verhalten begründen oder bestimmte Bekleidungsweisen nahelegen, sind grundsätzlich nicht zu überprüfen und zu bewerten’. See Federal Supreme Court Decision (BGE 134 I 56, E. 5.2, S. 63).

[17] (Author’s translation) ‘eine fundamentalistische Glaubensrichtung bezeuge’. See Federal Supreme Court Decision (BGE 134 I 49, Sachverhalt, S. 50).

[18] (Author’s translation) ‘sichtbarer Ausdruck der Unterwerfung der Frau unter den Mann’. See Federal Supreme Court Decision (BGE 134 I 49, Sachverhalt, S. 50).

[19] (Author’s translation) ‘Daran vermögen die Behauptungen einzelner, die Einbürgerung ablehnender Einwohnerräte, die dem Tragen des Kopftuches den Charakter eines religiösen Symbols aberkennen, nichts zu ändern’. See Federal Supreme Court Decision (BGE 134 I 49, Sachverhalt, S. 50).

[20] See Federal Supreme Court Decision (BGE 1P.149/2004, E. 2.1).

[21] See Federal Supreme Court Decision (BGE 1P.149/2004, E. 3.4).

[22] One of the most prominent examples of public resistance against the recognition of minarets as a religious symbol is the statement made by the Egerkinger committee, which launched in September 2007 a popular initiative that sought a constitutional ban on minarets. The committeee argued (author’s translation): ‘The construction of a minaret has no religious characteristics. Neither in the Quoran, nor in any other holy scripture of Islam is the minaret expressly mentioned at any rate. The minaret is far more a symbol of that religious-political power claim […]’. ‘Das Minarett als Bauwerk hat keinen religiösen Charakter; es wird weder im Koran noch in anderen heiligen Schriften des Islam auch nur erwähnt. Das Minarett ist vielmehr Symbol jenes religiös-politischen Machtanspruchs […]’. See Egerkinger Committee, Worum geht es? Volksinitiative (Webpresence) <www.minarette.ch> accessed 10 January 2008

[23] See Federal Supreme Court Decision (BGE 1P.26/2007, E. 4.1.2).

[24] (Author’s translation) ‘Eine Kirche ist auch ohne Turm eine Kirche. Ein Gebetsraum ist auch ohne Minarett ein Gebetsraum. Durch den Bau des ohnehin bloss symbolischen Minaretts wird die Nutzung der Gebetsräume nicht verändert’. See Administrative Court Decision of the Canton of Solothurn (VWBES.2006.293, E. 2b).

[25] (Author’s translation) ‘Kirchenglocken haben für viele Leute einen Wohlklang, und ihr regelmässiges Ertönen - auch frühmorgens - entspricht weit verbreiteter alter Tradition. Kirchengeläut hat sich weit über den Kreis der Gläubigen hinaus im Bewusstsein der Menschen eingeprägt, vermag auch religiös gleichgültige Leute zu bewegen und gehört für weite Teile der Bevölkerung zum festen Tagesablauf’. See Federal Supreme Court Decision (BGE 126 II 366, E. 3c, S. 371).

[26] See Federal Supreme Court Decision (BGE 125 I 300, E. 2a-3c, S. 304-310).

[27] A fact that was heavily criticized by the commentator Walter Gut. See generally Kreuz und Kruzifix in öffentlichen Räumen, Eine Auseinandersetzung mit Gerichtsentscheiden über Kreuze und Kruzifix in kommunalen Schulzimmern (NZN-Buchverlag, Zürich 1997).

[28] (Author’s translation) ‘Allerdings hat sich das Bundesgericht insofern grosse Zurückhaltung aufzuerlegen, als der Inhalt der Glaubenslehre in Frage steht. Eine Bewertung der Glaubenshaltung und -regeln oder gar eine Überprüfung ihrer theologischen Richtigkeit, insbesondere eine Interpretation der einschlägigen Stellen heiliger Schriften, bleibt dem Bundesgericht jedenfalls so lange verwehrt, als nicht die Grenzen der Willkür überschritten sind’. See Federal Supreme Court Decision (BGE 119 Ia 178, E. 4c, S. 185).

[29] See Federal Supreme Court Decision (BGE 123 I 296, E. 2a, S. 300).

[30] (Author’s translation) ‘[Das Gericht] kann sich uneingeschränkt mit der Religion als sozialem Phänomen auseinandersetzen’. See Federal Supreme Court Decision (BGE 119 Ia 178, E. 4c, S. 185).

[31] See Federal Supreme Court Decision (BGE 118 Ia 46, E. 4e/aa, S. 58).

[32] See Federal Supreme Court Decision (BGE 119 Ia 178, E. 4c, S. 185).

[33] For a more extensive appeal that especially jurists must come to terms with their professional limitations see Richli Paul, Interdisziplinäre Daumenregeln für eine faire Rechtsetzung: ein Beitrag zur Rechtsetzungslehre im liberalen sozial und ökologisch orientierten Rechtsstaat (Schulthess, Basel 2000).

[34] It may very well be the case that both parties in conflict sought expert advice in order to bolster their positions. A further expert opinion requested by the court would then be unnecessary and thus obsolete.